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Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishery is a cause for concern in many areas of the
globe.  There  have  been  various  ways  employed to prevent  or  deter  it,  among which  lies  the
“carding” system employed internationally by the EU. The “cards” are a representation of different
levels of warnings about unsustainable fishery before the EU ceases trade with the warned nation.
The research question is “What power dynamics become apparent between the EU and Vietnam in
relation to the governing of IUU fishery?” and explores the discursive relationship between them
and other  international  actors.  The thesis uses  discourse analysis  to find themes of  normative
power,  power relations and cultural  relativity. The discourse analysis was conducted using ten
interviews and written material online articles and documents. The thesis finds that there is still
much work to be done on the global scene regarding communication and cooperation. While there
is a will to do what is best for our planet, and many actors share the same goals, the language and
conditions are not universally applicable. The thesis concludes that there is a will to combat IUU
fishery, that the EU’s carding policies do give results, but also that the international  discourse
regarding  both  have  to  be  further  developed  and  studied  to  reach  more  mutually  beneficial
developments in the future.
Keywords:  EU,  Vietnam,  Fishery,  Resource  management,  Power  relations,  Normative  power,
Cultural relativity.
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subject, for her support and her expertise. I also wish to thank my key contact in
Rome, whose aid gave me access to vital sources and interviews. Finally I wish to
thank my wonderful family for their continued moral support, for helping me find
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This thesis will discuss how different groups of actors with a variety of opposing
and  similar  values  interact  around  the  question  of  Illegal,  unreported  and
unregulated (IUU) fishery  (European Commission 2015). Fishery is not only a
source of food, but a hobby, a livelihood and an industry. It is an important asset
for many nations around the world (Nationalencyclopedin n.d.; Jennings & Kaiser
1998). IUU fishery is a deep and complicated subject which has many different
consequences depending on the context of each case. One of the most common
effects of IUU fishery is the depletion of marine fauna due to over-fishing. While
this  affects  the environment,  it  also affects  livelihoods.  Many low and middle
income  countries  have  populations  of  small-scale  fishers  who  conduct  their
fishery close to the shore (European Commission n.d.). The depletion of marine
life on the high seas directly influences the availability of fish in the coastal areas,
and  by  extension  the  livelihoods  of  the  small-scale  fisher  populations,  as  the
shoreline  and  high  sea  ecosystems  are  not  static,  but  fluid  and  interlinked
(Jennings  & Kaiser  1998;  Manning  2015).  The  inherent  values  of  fishery  are
reflected in the differences of policies and priorities held by different nations. 
More nations  are  becoming aware in  one way or another  of the sustainability
aspect of fishery, be it from internal or external pressures. The EU has become a
forerunner in the fight against IUU fishery through strong internal regulations on
the domestic fishery of its member states, and further extending those policies to
its trading partners. By placing the same demands on its trade network as on its
own fleets, the EU is applying its regulations on the international stage through
the use of symbolic yellow and red cards, an allegory to those used in football, to
warn their  trading partners if  the EU observes noticeable  IUU fishery in  their
waters. 
In October 2017 the nation of Vietnam was issued a yellow card for their wild
capture  fishery  industry.  The  reason  being  a  lacking  traceability  and  illegal
activities  of  Vietnamese  fishing  vessels  in  the  pacific  and  in  the  waters  of
neighbouring countries (European Commission 2017b). Some examples listed by
the European Commission include; allowing foreign flagged ships and ships with
known IUU history to land their goods, a lack of control over where ships flying
the Vietnamese flag conduct their fishery, insufficient control over documentation
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and landing of fishery products by fishery authorities, lacking legal requirements
for fishing vessels to keep logs, and a failure to implement parts of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)  (European Commission
2017a). As of the writing of this thesis (January-October 2020), the discussion
between Vietnam and the EU is still ongoing.
The use of the carding policy may be interpreted as problematic due to the EU
extending its power into a sovereign nation on the other side of the globe. The EU
is a large supranational union with strong economic and political power who rely
on  imports  to  supply  their  population  with  the  marine  products  they  want.
Vietnam is a middle income country which depends on exports for a large part of
their economy. Furthermore, this thesis argues that within the implementations of
EU  IUU  policy,  the  EU  has  exercised  its  normative  power  through  bilateral
dialogue.  Most  notably  by  using  its  market  share  as  leverage  for  promoting
reforms.  Normative  power  is  a  term  used  in  social  sciences  to  explain  the
influence of one actor over another by spreading their internalized views to others.
This thesis will investigate the communication between the European Union and
the nation of Vietnam  through how their interactions are interpreted by various
international actors.
The study will be conducted using discourse analysis and applying the theories of
normative power, power dynamics and cultural relativity. By assuming different
actors  on  the  international  arena  frame  international  relations  differently,  this
thesis  uses  the  particular  case  of  Vietnam  as  the  basis  for  discussion  with
representatives from multiple different organizations involved in fishery and EU
IUU policy.  The experienced relation and interaction between these two actors
around the yellow card will be explored through discourse analysis to find any
general  themes  that  may appear.  The  themes  will  be  analysed  through power
dynamics, cultural relativity and normative power, the implications of which will
be explained further in chapter 5.
The thesis is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction where
the reader is given a summary of what the following chapters will explain and
why the research is relevant. Chapter 2 is an explanation of the background of
IUU fishery,  the  subject  in  relation  to  the  actors  involved  in  the  Vietnamese
yellow  card,  and  previous  studies  about  similar  subjects.  The  third  chapter
explains  the  aim  of  the  research,  the  research  problem and  its  sub-questions.
Chapter 4 explains to the reader how the material for research was gathered, how
the method of “discourse analysis” was used, and the personal background of the
author. The fifth chapter explains the theoretical approach of the research to the
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reader. Chapter 6 is the discussion and analysis of the gathered material, divided
into  three  sub-chapters  based  on  the  sub-questions  defined  in  the  research
problem.  The  final  chapter  7  concludes  the  thesis.  The  main  text  starts  here.
Remember that the introduction should start on an odd page number. Before you
begin to write in this template, please start with reading the instructions. You will
find the instructions in chapter 2.  
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2 Background
This chapter will provide a context introduction and theoretical background of the
thesis. This includes the meaning, background and history regarding IUU fishery,
International IUU fishery policies and relations, the Vietnamese fishing industry
and  the  current  situation  Vietnam is  facing  with  the  so  called  “yellow  card”
(explained in 2.2) as well as a literature review. 
2.1 A short Explanation of IUU Fishery
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing, or IUU fishing for short, has become
a major global problem. As populations increase, the need for food grows along
with it. The ocean is a major source of food for many parts of the world, and small
scale fishery is a major contributor to global food security and poverty reduction.
However, there are also concerns regarding over-exploitation due to the global
fishing  industry’s  rapid  expansion  (FAO/FIAD 2014).  The  FAO  defines  IUU
fishing as three categories (FAO 2002): 
1. Illegal  fishery refers  to  fisher  fishing  without  permission  from  the
government  of  the  nation  who  owns  the  water,  fishers  who  hold
permission but ignore regulations or fishers who violate international laws
on international waters.
2. Unreported fishery  refers to fishery where the catch goes unreported to
the local authorities and is thus unregistered.
3. Unregulated fishery refers to when a management organization is unable
or  unwilling  to  assert  management  and  regulations  over  its  area  of
influence and marine resources.
In 2019 the global seafood market produced approximately 177.8 million tonnes
with a  total  trade value  of  roughly  160.5 billion  USD  (FAO/Globefish  2020).
Aquaculture  and  capture  fisheries  are  by  no  means  a  small  market,  and  the
products  produced  by  the  industries  play  important  parts  in  the  economy  of
multiple nations. Therefore, every coastal nation has been granted an “exclusive
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economic zone” (EEZ) where only ships with their home port within the nation or
with special permission may fish (UN/UNCLOS 1982). Trespassing into another
nation’s EEZ to cast nets or sell your catch falls under the “I” in IUU fishery. The
established boundaries enable easier regulation and documentation of both how
much marine flora and fauna is available in a given nation’s territory, how much
is caught and where it was fished and brought to land, preventing the “UU” parts
of IUU. However, in the case of disagreements between nations regarding were to
lay the borders, or in the case of islands far from the main shoreline, the overlap
becomes somewhat of a grey zone, where neither nation has the international right
to enforce their own law until an agreement is reached (UN/UNCLOS 1982). 
2.2 IUU and the EU
The EU enforces strict policies on its member states regarding documentation and
otherwise adhering to international laws. This includes full reports of what marine
products which have been extracted, where it has been extracted and where it was
brought to port  (European Commission 2009). This is generally in line with the
recommendations  presented by the FAO previously described.  It  is  one of the
factors enabling the labelling system currently in place on marine goods, allowing
consumers to track where whatever marine product they buy originated by simply
looking at the packaging. The EU further holds its foreign trading partners to the
same  standards,  expecting  them  to  document  and  report  how  and  where  the
marine  products  have  been caught,  and to  show it  was  done in  a  sustainable
manner (European Commission 2009). 
The EU issues “cards” to some of its trading partners. A yellow or red card, an
allegory to the warning system used in football, may be issued to a nation if the
EU  were  to  find  something  they  oppose  in  their  fishing  industry  (European
Commission  2015).  If  preceding  discussions  about  the  concerns  are  not
satisfactory,  the EU may issue a  yellow card or  “notice  of pre-identification”,
meaning that if the points of concern are not addressed, the EU will cease trade in
fisheries  related  products with the country in  question.  After  issuing a yellow
card,  the  EU will  work  together  with  the  nation  in  question  to  develop  their
industries in a way to fulfil the demands of the European Commission, but if the
efforts  are  deemed  unfruitful,  the  card  will  instead  turn  red  (European
Commission 2015).  Cooperation may continue under a  red card and lead to a
downgrade to a yellow again, and even to a removal of the cards altogether. There
is a blacklisting only issued in a worst-case scenario where the EU deems their
partner to have no interest in cooperating, which leads to a complete shutdown of
trade (Leroy et al. 2016). A country may be delisted, but it requires open dialogue
and a demonstrable will to change (European Commission 2015). Currently only
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six  nations  have  been  blacklisted,  of  which  three  have  worked  to  have  their
blacklisting revoked (European Commission n.d.). 
2.3 IUU Fishery, Vietnam and the Global Market
Vietnam is  a  relatively  small  nation  when  viewed  from a  global  perspective.
However, its EEZ stretches more than one million square kilometres and its ports
house a large fishing fleet. In 2007 it was estimated that 40% of animal protein
consumed  in  Vietnam came  from seafood  (Raakjær  et  al.  2007).  The  fishery
industry was recently restructured to promote growth and social security, with one
of the goals being to increase the average income of a fisherman in 2010 with
250%  by  2020  (Ngo  2014).  The  government  has  subsidized  and  promoted
modernization and transition to off-shore fishery over the last few decades, which
has led to a rapid increase in the size and number of ships present in the South
China  Sea  (Boonstra  &  Nguyen  2010;  Ngo  2014).  So  much  in  fact  that  the
common-pool resource of marine fauna is over-exploited. Marine populations are
diminishing and fishermen are unable to catch as much as they would like. It is, in
short,  an  example  of  the  “Tragedy  of  the  Commons”  in  Vietnamese  seafood
production (Nguyen 2008). 
Fishers have begun to encroach on neighbouring nations’ territory to cast their
nets, which has led to soured relations with surrounding countries (Nguyen 2018).
This is  further  complicated  by the ongoing territorial  disputes surrounding the
South China Sea, as multiple nations lay claim to the same areas.
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In 2005 the estimated production of Vietnamese capture fisheries was 2 million
tons per year  (Raakjær et al. 2007). Eleven years later, in 2016, the number had
grown to 2.6 million tons per year (World Bank). Comparing the later number to
the recommended maximum sustainable extraction by the Vietnamese Ministry of
Agriculture  and Rural  Development  (MARD),  2.4 million  tons  per  year  (Ngo
2014), makes it apparent that the recommended extraction limits  are not being
followed. The institutions meant to regulate and uphold the laws and rules have
been  underfunded,  under-equipped  and  under-manned.  Thus  they  have  been
unable to fulfil their  role as a regulatory mechanism  (Nguyen et al.  2017). To
rectify this, the Vietnamese government designed a plan of action to combat IUU
fishery within their waters (Nguyen 2018). 
The EU is a major importer of Vietnamese seafood. According to the Vietnam
Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP); Vietnamese seafood
exports to the EU during August 2020 were valued as nearly 98 million USD and
the annual value of such exports are growing yearly (VASEP 2020). After many
discussions  the  European  Commission  decided  to  issue  a  “yellow  card”  to
Vietnam, meaning that unless the IUU issues are addressed and rectified, the EU
will  cease  imports  of  seafood  caught  by  Vietnamese  vessels  (European
14
Illustration 1: Map referenced by Interviewee 1. Disputed Territorial claims in
the South China Sea. From “Is Joint Exploration The Answer to the South China
Sea dispute?” By A. Gnanasagaran, 2018, https://theaseanpost.com/article/joint-
exploration-answer-south-china-sea-dispute
Commission 2017b; a). The union has established standards for traceability and
sustainability for its own production, and holds its imported goods to the same
standards  they  hold their  own fleets  (Miller  et  al.  2014).  These  standards  are
supposed  to  ensure  that  the  marine  products  entering  the  union  will  have  a
minimal negative impact on the global environment, flora and fauna. When the
EU observes that a trade partner does not fulfil their standards for IUU fishery,
they  will  enter  into  negotiations  to  encourage  the  other  party  to  develop
regulations and institutions preventing issues leading to IUU fishery  (European
Commission 2015). Depending on the development these discussions lead to, the
EU may continue  trade  or  issue a  so called  “yellow card”  or  “notice  of  pre-
identification”. 
Vietnam is currently working with the EC to implement changes and action plans
to accommodate the demands (Sẻ 2019). After more than two years have passed
since the issuing of the card there are still some challenges left before it may be
removed. According to the newspaper “Vietnam Times”, removal of the yellow
card  is  a  pressing  concern,  because  if  the  card  were  to  turn  red  it  may set  a
precedent  for  other  major  importers  such  as  the  US  to  conduct  their  own
investigation  (Lee  2020).  There  are  currently  two  main  issues  preventing  the
removal of the card according to the director of the department of fisheries. These
are enabling  better  control  over  local  administrative  violations  and controlling
vessels illegally entering foreign EEZs. Vietnam hopes to remove the yellow card
during 2020 (Nguyen & Minh 2020).
Fishery  in  Vietnam  has  been  studied  by  multiple  scholars.  The  foundational
starting point of this thesis was inspired and influenced by the following studies:
Boonstra & Hanh (2015) whom investigated Vietnamese aquaculture and climate
change and Boonstra & Nguyen (2010) whom investigated the history and reasons
surrounding Vietnamese non-compliance to fisheries regulations. The latter was
complimented by  Boonstra et al. (2017) who conducted a follow-up study. The
studies provided baseline information about Vietnamese fishery and provided a
background to expand upon, albeit through different goals and methods.
2.4 Literature Review
This  chapter  will  discuss  previous  studies  regarding  top-down  decisions  and
international normativity. The subjects have been studied by multiple scholars in
many different contexts, a small selection of which will be discussed. 
The top-down decision making has been a main critique to the implementation of
EU nature  preservation  policies.  As a  counterpoint,  it  may be argued that  the
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inclusion of locals may lead to less than desired results. This dichotomy becomes
apparent through two studies regarding the implementation of Natura 2000 nature
conservation programs within the EU. While the Natura 2000-projects are focused
on  preserving  ecosystems  and  natural  habitats  on  land  rather  than  sea,  the
arguments regarding nature conservation bear some similarities  to IUU fishery
discussion. The two scholars Björkell and van den Belt arrive at differing albeit
complimentary conclusions. Björkell’s (2008) study of the implementation of a
nature reserve in Malax, Finland shows that a lack of communication between
local actors and state actors negatively affected the project’s implementation. The
study  shows  that  a  top-down  approach  does  not  give  much  room  for  local
adaptability, and that “what the civil servant finds legally acceptable might not be
accepted  at  higher  levels  in  the  organization”  (Björkell  2008).  Thus  the
possibilities  civil  servants  had to  raise  local  trust  in  the project  was hindered.
Björkell also argues that already established local efforts and methods must be
taken into account, as common pool theory stresses involvement of all affected
actors as a necessity. Van den Belt (2008), however, argues that allowing local
involvement  in policy making often leads  to less than satisfactory results  in a
study of French implementation of Natura 2000 nature protection areas. s
“On the one hand, we have to recognize that a top–down policy does not work. On the other
hand, the attempt to involve local stakeholders like farmers, foresters and hunters in setting
the goals for nature policy through public participation tends to result in outcomes that are
much  less  satisfactory  from  an  ecological  point  of  view.”
– (van den Belt 2008)
Citing  Shapiro (1999), van den Belt argues that decisions are based on interests
and power, and that locals are often more interested in preserving the status quo
than committing to changes in the way they use their environment and resources.
The study concludes that local agency may hamper the national or global goals of
biodiversity  and/or sustainability,  and thus that the agency of locals should be
reformed in the face of the larger picture  (van den Belt 2008). The two studies
show that the discussion of top-down and bottom-up decisions are two sides of the
same coin, and that either may have a negative impact on the greater picture if
taken too far. 
Theories regarding the international normativity of the EU has been discussed in
three articles which inspired this thesis. Manners (2002, 2008) discusses how the
EU deliberately has- and continues  to influence the norms of the international
community. Manners discusses how the EU has changed the common opinions
and norms surrounding capital punishment through multiple strategies, including
international agreements and information campaigns  (Manners 2002) as well as
promoting  a  general  acceptance  for  international  cooperation  (Manners  2008).
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This thesis uses Manners’ definition of normativity and is further discussed in the
theory chapter 5.2. 
Miller et al. (2014) expanded on the topic by discussing the EU’s use of its market
power to influence its trading partners’ policies and norms. They found that the
EU’s large market share in the global marine product economy has allowed the
EU to exert authority outside of its borders. The market power of the EU, Miller
et al. (2014) argue, is further strengthened by the current international norms of
IUU fishery policy implementation. However, the position of the EU’s authority
comes into question when their own fleets are observed conducting IUU fishery,
which damages their relation to those they wish to influence. The study concludes
that,  while  the EU holds a  strong position on the international  arena,  the best
results for international cooperation should come from cooperation, rather than
the EU “teaching” it’s partners what they believe is the correct model  (Miller et
al. 2014). 
Leroy et al.  (2016) conducted a study of the EU’s IUU trade policies and the
effectiveness of trade measures. They note that, while the EU’s policies regarding
IUU fishery may be applied to members of the Union and its trade partners alike,
the EU’s large dependence  on imports  may lead to  the policies  being applied
majorly on the global scale rather than the domestic. However, the regulations are
meant to be non-discriminatory as they apply to both member states and trade
partners. They conclude that while the EU’s international IUU trade policies are
relatively  effective,  and  the  EU  creates  a  common  normative  international
understanding of IUU fishery, the policies are only one part of what is necessary
for the continued sustainability of marine products (Leroy et al. 2016). 
Antonova (2016) discusses international  power relations and the results  of EU
policy implementation in third countries. As with previously mentioned studies,
Antonova discusses how the EU’s international relations and policies have aspects
of normative influence baked in. Using a case study of Eu fishery relations to
Senegal, Antonova compares the EU’s founding principles of liberty, democracy
and respect to its current actions on the global scene. The study shows that the
EU’s international agreements and policy implementation agreements may lack
understanding of local necessities and conditions before they are presented and
implemented,  needing multiple  or major  revisions  before they are successfully
applied (Antonova 2016). 
Rosello (2017) studied the international interplay between nations in regards to
IUU fishery policy  by looking at  the  case  of  Cambodia  and the  EU. Rosello
discusses how international discussions about IUU fishery lack a clearly defined
legal framework to which diplomatic discussions may relate. Cambodian marine
17
products were blacklisted by the EU in 2015  (European Commission n.d.).  By
using the case of EU and Cambodia, Rosello shows that the inherent normativity
of the EU’s international IUU policies may be an attempt and/or be used for a
harmonized international understanding of IUU fishery. However, the study also
shows the importance of consent, good faith and a will for mutual cooperation
alongside formal agreements (Rosello 2017).
More recent studies on the normativity and international IUU fishery prevention
activity of the EU have been conducted by  Tavornmas & Cheeppensook (2020)
and  Kunnamas  (2020).   
Tavornmas  & Cheeppensook  (2020) discuss  how the  EU actively  diffuses  its
norms  outside  of  its  own  borders  with  the  goal  of  promoting  more
environmentally and socially sustainable fisheries. The paper discusses the EU’s
carding of Thailand in 2015, the implementation of EU-led IUU policy reforms,
and the revocation of the card in 2019. While the norms of the EU, presented and
introduced through the IUU policy agreements, were diffused and implemented in
Thailand,  Tavornmas  &  Cheeppensook observe  that  the  same  norms  further
diffused  into  ASEAN  after  their  implementation  in  Thailand  (Tavornmas  &
Cheeppensook 2020). 
Kunnamas  (2020) shows  that  the  EU’s  international  policies  of  normative
diffusion  has  pressured  Thailand  into  introducing  policies  of  freedom  of
expression and democracy. The study uses the theory of normativity presented by
the  previously  mentioned  Manners  to  show how the  EU  was  able  to  change
another nation, as well as parts of ASEAN by using the pressure of the yellow
card and other sanctions (Kunnamas 2020). 
This review shows that the subjects of international normative power, IUU fishery
and EU international  environmental  policies are very much alive and relevant.
They show that the subjects are interconnected and have been observed to be so.
Furthermore, they show that there are still  a lot to learn and study about these
concepts.
Vietnam had held their yellow card for three years at the writing of this thesis.
There was, however, little in the way of investigations or reports available which
discussed the implications of the carding in the case of Vietnam. While writing,
this  author  noticed  more  studies  surfacing  about  the  EU’s  international  and
normative power relations in regards to carding and other aspects. However, the
subject  of  the  effects  on  Vietnam  and  the  discussions  between  organizations
surrounding  the  subject  were  still  lacking.  This  thesis  joins  the  previously
mentioned studies in an effort to gain a better understanding of the intricate nature
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of EU and IUU fishery related  international  communication,  collaboration  and
normative influence. This is done by investigating the differences and similarities
in discourse between various organizations, which this author found lacking at the
time of writing.
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3 Aim and Research Problem
The aim of this thesis is to show  if there are any differences  or similarities in
communication regarding IUU fishery in the gathered material, and to find how
these differences may affect discussions. 
The  research  problem and question of this thesis is:  “How do power dynamics
become apparent between the EU and Vietnam in relation to the governing of
IUU fishery?” 
This will be assisted by the following three sub-questions:
• How is communication about IUU fishery policies, and/or the lack there
of, between organizations made visible and discussed?
• How does the  normative power  of the European Union become apparent
through the lens of IUU fishery policies?




This chapter contains an explanation of the methods and theories used to gather
material as well as how they were applied to reach the final conclusions. First the
concept and use of “discourse analysis” is explained. The section describes the
basic meaning and uses of the method, as well as how it will be applied in the
thesis. The section that follows explains how the material and information used in
the thesis  was gathered.  In  the final  section  I,  the  author,  present  a  truncated
personal  background.  This  section  explains  my  disciplinary  background,  my
connection to the subject, how I affected the field and how I was affected in turn.
4.1 Discourse analysis
Discourse, according to Foucault, is divided into “the will to truth”, “the division
of madness” and “the forbidden speech” (Foucault 1981). By this he means that
humanity has striven throughout history to create a fathomable and correct view
of the world, and use language to shape their interpretation, by which the will to
truth becomes the most powerful of the three. A discourse is thus the common
interpretation of the truth present within a group of people who share the same
internalized  values  and  understandings  of  what  is  right  and  wrong.  Friedrich
Nietzsche argued that truths are illusions born from the use of common metaphors
and the inherent meanings and values of words, all of which contribute to paint a
picture  of  the  world  commonly  accepted  by  those  speaking  the  language
(Nietzsche  1873).  As  the  discourse  and  shared  opinion  of  what  is  the  truth
becomes the norm of the group in question this thesis assumes that discourse =
norm = the socially acceptable truth. 
A discourse analysis seeks to illuminate the apparent truths and trends within a
discourse.  This  thesis  assumes a  post-structural  and cultural-relative  (see  5.1.)
approach  by  interpreting  discourse  as  something  shaped  by  both  internal  and
external  factors  affecting  the  informant.  Thus  one  must  understand  the
circumstances of a discourse to understand the discourse itself.  As language is
how we describe the world around us, the internalized values will be reflected in
the way a person speaks  (Nietzsche 1873).  However,  as different  people have
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different  ways of  interpreting  their  experiences,  their  individual  interpretations
will  be  reflected  in  how they  speak  about  a  subject  dependent  on  their  role,
upbringing, experiences and much more  (Foucault 1981). This means that even
though the internal values and experiences of informants play a role in shaping
their  discourse,  the  discourses  of  others  and  their  society  also  affect  their
presentation and interpretation of their reality. 
Discourse analysis will be applied in this thesis by studying and interpreting ten
interviews.  The  analysis  will  be  presented  through  recurring  themes  and  the
author’s interpretations of the internalized and/or embedded values and norms that
appear  through the choice  of  focus  and subject  matter  of  the  informants.  The
purpose of analysing interviews instead of written statements is to see spontaneity
between informants. While  each organization may have written statements  and
articles about the subject matter, which may also be interesting to analyse, this
author believes that individuality is partially lost in the process of official writing.
Focusing  on  the  subjects  spontaneously  brought  up  through  semi-structured
interviews  illuminates  the  apparent  relations  and  the  communication  between
different actors, regarding theirs and others’ roles, priorities and values in relation
to IUU fishery.
4.2 Material Collection
This study is based on different actors’ views and reactions to the EU’s carding
policy.  To  gain  a  wide  range  of  interpretations  to  analyse,  many  multiple
organizations  were  approached.  The  response  provided  informants  who  either
have been or are currently involved with IUU fishing policy development and/or
implementation.  These  include  representatives  from Swedish,  Vietnamese  and
UK-based  Non-Governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  and  Governmental
organizations (GOs), as well as different departments within the FAO (The Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). The scale of responsibilities
and roles held by the institutions range all the way from presenting global goals,
to international cooperation, to local policy implementation. This ensures a wide
array of answers from informants  who come from different  contexts,  and thus
hold different views and interpretations. The interviews were conducted in a semi-
structured manner, recorded and transcribed. It would have been interesting for
the study to interview a representative from the EU fisheries sector. The attempts
to do so regrettably proved unsuccessful. Finally, secondary source material was
also gathered through articles, reports and papers.
The informants  were asked to explain what they and their  organizations  do in
relation  to  IUU fishery.  The semi-structured format  allowed the informants  to
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steer  the  discussion  towards  what  they  thought  was  important  to  talk  about
regarding IUU and the EU carding policy. The key points were then extracted,
divided into three categories and combined into the analyses presented in the later
chapters.  The  numbering  of  the  interviews,  the  types  of  organizations  they
represent and the dates they were conducted are available in  Appendix 1. The
exact roles, offices and positions of the informants are withheld in the interest of
confidentiality,  as some of the subjects discussed may be considered sensitive.
Examples of questions used during the semi-structured interviews are available in
Appendix 2.
4.3 Personal Background
Being an anthropologist,  I  want to understand how people may have differing
thoughts and ways to interpret and discuss the world around them, as well as one
another. I believe that humans construct an image of the world around us that we
can understand and which fits our own internal narratives of how things work,
quite similar to the “constructivist” mindset presented by  Creswell & Creswell
(2018).  When reading about  and discussing the subject,  I  noticed  that  several
organizations have different ways of discussing the importance of various issues
inherent  in  IUU fishery.  Some may  focus  on  the  environmental  conservation,
some on the economic benefits  and issues and others may focus on the social
complications  of  IUU  fishery.  These  three  examples  are  all  under  the  same
umbrella as they are the corner stones in what we call “sustainability”. All three
issues must be taken into account  for a policy or action to be sustainable,  but
different groups and different contexts may cause different priorities to appear.
The variety of interpretations of our reality that I observed is what drove me to
write this thesis. Finally;  my interest in Vietnam stems from having spent two
years of my youth in Hanoi. During that time I accompanied multiple delegations
to various collaborative development projects involving Sweden and Vietnam. It
was in part due to those trips that my interest  for both rural  development and
cultural interaction took root.
The interviews have been hampered by the worldwide pandemic COVID-19. As I
was unable to travel and conduct interviews personally,  my fieldwork was cut
short and my interviews were conducted predominantly by telephone or through
online  video  conferencing  tools.  The  situation  led  to  multiple  possible
interviewees dropping contact due to matters of more pressing importance.
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5 Theoretical Approaches
This  chapter  will  discuss  and  explain  the  three  theories  of  cultural  relativity,
normative  power  and  power  relations  and  relate  them  to  examples.  The
interpretation and analysis of the discourses which become apparent through the
interviews  will  be  based  on the  presented  theories.  However,  while  the  three
theories are different, they also tie into each other. This too will be discussed. 
5.1 Cultural Relativism
This thesis will be using the branch
and definition of normative cultural
relativism  presented  by  Spiro
(1986).  This  means  to  operate  on
two  assumptions  about  culture:  1)
there  is  no  universal  pancultural
standard with which a culture may
be measured. 2) and since there is
no  cultural  universal  standard,  the
judgment  between  right  or  wrong,
true  or  false,  normality  or
abnormality  is  relative  to  the
cultural  standards that define them
(Spiro 1986). This means that even
if the norms of one culture appear strange and unnatural to a representative of
another, the former norms is as equally valid as the latter’s, as the observed norm
is accepted as a natural part of life for those who have internalized it. 
The  assumption  that  all  cultures  and  values  are  equal  and  legitimate  may  be
misused to justify anything or everything as being acceptable and good. That is
not how the theory will be used in this thesis. Instead the theory will be applied
using  three  assumptions.  First,  everyone  holds  and  practices  an  internalized
understanding of right, wrong, true and false based on their surrounding culture
and norms. Second, they act on what they believe is good and beneficial. Third,
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Illustration  2: “A  matter  of  perspective”  
by Anton Möller
the  interpretations  and  perceived  benefits,  challenges,  rights,  wrongs,  truths,
fallacies, possibilities and problems may differ between actors. What this means
in the context of this thesis is that the information and opinions presented during
interviews  and  through  written  sources  will  be  assumed  to  be  based  on  the
internalized  truth of the person making the statement.  This further  applies  the
author himself, which means that the author will reflexively have to keep his own
internalized world view and biases in mind during the interpretation of data. 
The  informants  whom  were  being  interviewed  were  gathered  from  different
nationalities,  affiliations  and  backgrounds.  This  implies  that  they  will  have
different  internalized  values,  even  though  some  may  be  from  the  same
organizations. While all the interviewed parties are involved in IUU fishery, they
are part of different organizations, cultures and sub-cultures. This means that they
all hold different ways of framing and interpreting their reality  (Foucault 1981;
Hylland  Eriksen  2000).  The  same  way  a  single  culture  contains  many  sub-
cultures,  the  culture  within  an  organization  varies  depending  on  which  part,
sphere or team one interacts with. Depending on the organization the informants
represent,  and the way they interpret  the questions and the interviewer’s aims,
they will subconsciously or deliberately assume a role for the situation. Based on
the expectations  placed on them by the institutional  policies  their  organization
represents,  and  how  they  personally  want  me  to  interpret  them,  they  will  be
tailoring their answers to the context of the interview (Goffman 1978). In short, to
understand why a person acts, speaks and interprets the world as they do, one
must  understand  where  they  are  coming  from  and  what  they  base  their
understanding of reality upon (Hagberg 2013). 
As  explained  in  chapter  4.1,  discourse  and  communication  between  actors  is
reliant on the perceptions and values internalized by those involved. By assuming
the views presented are a representation of the personal truth of an informant,
cultural  relativism  allows  us  to  explore  the  diversity  of  perceptions  and
viewpoints present within the communication surrounding IUU fishery.
5.2 Normative power 
The following chapter will explain the theory of normative power. An exercise of
normative  power  is  when  an  actor  uses  their  position  of  power  to  influence
another in their common everyday values or actions. This thesis will be using the
definition of normative power presented by  Manners (2002, 2008). To simplify
Manners’  definition: “normative  power”  is  the  power  to  not  only  affect  the
opinions  and  values  of  a  people,  but  more  specifically  what  is  considered
“normal” within the collective consciousness of a people. Some choice examples
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of  these  norms are  the  European  perceptions  of  basic  human  rights,  equality,
sustainability and democracy (Manners 2002). 
The “normativity” of these subjects in this context is how they are presented as
universally  applicable  rather  than  a  social  construct  (Manners  2008).  The EU
generally spreads its influence as a normative power through example rather than
coercion. This is described as  the concept of “transference” by Manners (2002),
by  which  the  EU promotes  its  norms by using  their  integration  as  terms  and
conditions for joint development- or trade agreements with non-union states and
actors. Multiple scholars have studied the EU as a normative power using various
approaches.  For  example,  Manners  (2002) presents  an  example  of  the
international normative power of the EU by explaining changes in the global norm
of acceptance towards capital punishment. The EU has, through a gradual increase
in  international  discussion,  media  attention  and  diplomatic  demands  over  the
course  of  two  decades,  created  a  change  in  the  juridical  systems  of  multiple
nations.  The  changes  were  made  through  incentives  and  lobbying  rather  than
coercion,  and  the  end  result  was  a  public  acceptance  of  the  new  policies.
According to Manners (2002), the promotion of one’s own ideals and values is
common in international politics, but the EU is successful through this method of
exercising normative power. Manners concludes that “the ability to define what
passes  for  ‘normal’  in  world  politics  is,  ultimately,  the  greatest  power of  all”
(Manners 2002).
The  study of  gender  and  normality  in  transitional  Poland  by  Lindelöf  (2006)
provides another example of the EU’s exercise of normative power within itself.
Lindelöf’s  study illustrates  how the social  construction  of Polish femininity  is
changing after the nation’s entry into the EU. The aspect of appearing “European”
becomes  a  growing  part  of  the  social  norm  in  Poland,  and  the  will  for
“Europeanness” affects the dominant socially accepted images of the gender roles
which  are reproduced within their  society.  “Europeanness”  in  this  sense  is  an
amalgamation  of  what  is  considered  good  examples  and  ideals  of  different
systems from the EU member states. While Lindelöf’s informants may not have
experienced  the  examples  “Europeanness”  first  hand,  they  still  try  to  emulate
them, because doing so is what it means to be “European”  (Lindelöf 2006). In
short,  the  entry  into  the  EU has  and  is  changing  the  social  norms of  Poland
through displays of positive examples. 
The IUU regulations  of  the EU become a normative  influence  when they are
applied internationally.  In studying the EU’s IUU regulation policies  and their
success in the Pacific Islands area,  Miller et al. (2014) illustrate how the EU’s
market  power  works  alongside  their  normative  power  in  an  attempt  to  create
international changes well beyond the borders of the EU. Miller et al. explain that
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the EU, being a large market, is able to use its market power to influence how a
nation or people manage their resources. While the changes requested by the EU
through their carding policies are voluntary, the alternative is to lose them as a
trading  partner.  According  to  their  study,  the  EU  has  been  attempting  to
implement its own IUU regulations as the basis from which others should write
theirs.
The examples  above illustrate  how the EU has a normative effect both within
itself  and  internationally.  The  largely  successful  campaign  to  abolish  capital
punishment  internationally  by  presenting  the  EU  and  its  values  as  a  positive
example to follow and the push for EU standards in international fishery have
parallels  with  the  introduction  of  “Europeanness”  to  the  Polish  population.
Thought the contexts are vastly different,  each case shows how the norms and
values of the EU are presented and experienced to be the “correct” norms, which
further influences how other actors perceive certain questions and how they will
act in the future. 
5.3 Power dynamics
Power dynamics are a widely discussed subject and this chapter will explain how
the theory will be interpreted and applied in this thesis. The definition of power
used in this thesis is based on a combination of Foucault (1978) and how gender
dynamics  were  described  by  Hirdman  (1988).  The  main  points  taken  from
Foucault  are:  1) power is  practiced rather than inherent,  2) power is  given by
those who believe they are lower in a hierarchy to those believed to hold power,
3) power is always exercised with an aim or objective (Foucault 1978). In the case
of Hirdman, the dichotomous categories of power and subordination will illustrate
how different actors are able to dictate what is “good” or “bad” practice, define
who is right and wrong, and how the powerful define what is normal  (Hirdman
1988). 
To explain power based on this dichotomy let us make a theoretical example. Two
persons meet every day and work together. When one of them assumes the right
to dictate how the other may act, the power dynamic becomes apparent. If the
other conforms, it implies that the former holds power. If the opposite occurs, the
power rests with the latter. This interplay is simplified for the sake of explanation,
and the continued interaction may continue to spiral into conflict, but this can be
applied to anything from two individuals, to a state and its people, to international
geopolitics.
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Foucault  (1978) explains  that  power  is  given  from the  bottom and the  power
dynamics presented by  Hirdman (1988) further show that the powerful party is
regarded as the example of norms. This is made apparent by how attention and/or
consequences are brought to the weaker party whenever they may divert from the
acceptable conditions or actions decided by those with power  (Hirdman 1988).
This ties the power dynamics into the topic of normative power. The European
Union holds a powerful seat in the global marine product marketplace  (Leroy et
al.  2016) and  Vietnam  is  one  of  many  smaller  nations  they  trade  with.
Furthermore, the cards are actively issued with a clear intent, which ties into the
definitions of power borrowed from Foucault (1978).
5.4 Summary of the application of theories
These theories and mindsets have guided my views and my conceptualization of
the research problem in various ways. A culturally relative mindset lets the author
assume all  actors are acting in good faith and for what they believe is a good
solution  based  on  their  own  values.  Power  dynamics  will  make  visible  the
inherent hegemonic relations between Vietnam and the EU, as well as other actors
involved in the question.  Finally, normative power shows how the “good” norms
of a powerful actor are spread through discourse and other means to less powerful
actors. 
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6 Data, Analysis and Discussion
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study. The findings were
predominantly the result of interviews and to a lesser degree reviews of literature.
The interviews were transcribed, anonymized and their  statements divided and
sorted into different visible themes relating to the sub-questions in chapter 3. Each
of  the  following  chapters  was  written  using  the  aforementioned  material  and
relates to one of the three formerly mentioned sub-questions.
6.1 How is communication about IUU fishery policies, 
and/or the lack there of, between organizations made 
visible and discussed?
This  chapter  focuses  on  the  way in  which  different  actors  communicate.  The
section has been divided into three themes based on reoccurring themes during the
interviews. Understanding the common opinions and views surrounding the issue
of  the Vietnamese  yellow card  opens the door  to  understanding the  dynamics
behind current  discussions.  Thus this  chapter  will  discuss  what  the  interviews
showed is generally  agreed upon, what is different and how the present views
reflect on their associations.
6.1.1 Common understandings
Three themes reoccur throughout all interviews. These themes include: 1) IUU
fishery is a problem, 2) IUU fishery must be prevented, 3) the sustainability of
marine life in the oceans is important and must be protected. 
“Maybe  on  one  day  you  don’t  have  any  fish  to  eat,  so  we  have  to  work  together.”
– Interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO)
These sentiments also become apparent when reading material  released by the
EU. The further details and methods often diverge depending on the informant,
however a majority agreed that the methods to combat IUU fishery all over the
world are similar, but must be adapted and implemented based on local contexts. 
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6.1.2 Views on the roles of different organizations 
The material presented multiple differences in how different actors interpreted the
situation. The main observed differences within each informant’s viewpoints were
based  on  the  roles  they  and  the  organization  they  represented  held.  Each
informant  presented  the  role  of  domestic  and  international  organizations  in
different ways. Even the perspectives presented by informants within the FAO
differed from each other. One of them stressed the importance of the FAO as an
international neutral and unbiased mediator (interview 4, FAO) in discussions like
the one between the EU and Vietnam, this aspect was never brought up by non-
FAO informants.  The European and Vietnamese NGO and GO representatives
instead discussed such things as the role of the European Union’s delegations or
the influence of the global  marketplace.  This may be due to the interviewer’s
questions not leading the non-FAO informants to the subject, but it presents an
interesting picture. While one organization does hold an important international
position in the question of IUU fishery, and they do play a large role in the work
surrounding  the  issue,  it  does  not  necessarily  mean  it  is  part  of  the  common
associative pattern of outsiders. Furthermore, it illustrates how an organizational
culture affects the scale of how IUU fishery is presented. While other informants
came from NGOs and GOs working on the local and regional scale,  the FAO
works on a global scale. Many informants discussed the implications and issues
regarding local and regional fisheries, but only a few brought up the global scale
of IUU fishery issues. 
Interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO) explained that sometimes it is easy to forget that
this is a global problem, and that Vietnam is only one nation of many working
with it, but the issue of IUU fishery is not only the responsibility of Vietnam. 
“We are working on the IUU, we want to make that the fishermen in Vietnam respect the law,
we want to make sure that our fishery is improved. But on the other hand, that (IUU) is not
only  the  responsibility  of  Vietnam,  it  is  in  the  whole  global  context.”
– Interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO)
Interview 2 (FAO) also explained that IUU fishery deals with resources that move
fluidly between borders, thus no one nation can be responsible. However, rather
than cooperative policies being created and enacted because of this fact, many
times the actual policies may show the complete opposite.
“When you talk about wild capture fisheries from the high seas, or the sea in general, what
happens is that before the fish is caught it usually does not belong to any country, and that
creates  a  very  different  way,  a  different  behavior,  in  how  companies  and  countries  act
towards this product (compared to agriculture). If the product is not associated to anyone, no
one should take care of the product. […]  We (humans) are not very used to think about a
product  that  can  be  influenced  by  the  actions  of  other  participating  countries  before  it
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becomes national. Because if country-A starts fishing a lot of Fishy-X it’s going to reduce the
availability of Fishy-X for countries B, C and D. […] I think it’s a lot of a prisoner’s dilemma
exercise.”
– Interview 2 (FAO)
Another subject brought up during Interview 2 and Interview 8 regarding how
IUU is about resources that move freely between borders and the vessels which
follow them.  The  matter  of  international  cooperation  becomes  complex  when
different nations’ laws are at ends with each other. Gear and methods allowed in
one nation may be banned in another. Even if a vessel has a certificate and permit
to cross the border into another nation’s waters to fish, they may become illegal
due to their methods.
“The ‘illegal’ part of IUU is a national concept. So, from times, you have an operation that
can  be  illegal  in  country  A  but  can  be  permitted  in  country  B.”
– Interview 2 (FAO)
(When discussing cooperative fishery agreements) “Pair trawling is legal in Vietnam, but
that is illegal in Cambodia. […] So technically while the Vietnamese are not doing anything
illegal  by  Vietnamese  law,  their  methods  become  illegal  anyway.”
– Interview 8 (Swedish NGO) 
6.1.3 Organizational preferences made visible
This section will discuss how the differences become apparent and how they are
linked. Throughout the interviews there were many different angles, stories and
responsibilities which were conveyed. While not necessarily conflicting with each
other, the interviews each pointed to different issues and possibilities based on
their individual priorities. Interviews 8 and 9 (Swedish NGO) discussed that the
Vietnamese government and the local  committees have the power to end IUU
fishery  very  quickly  if  they  were  to  use  the  constitutional  powers  of  the
government,  something that  will  be discussed in a  later  chapter.  For example,
interview  6  (Vietnamese  GO)  rather  said  that  “it  is  hard  because  we  are  a
developing country” in regards to policy reform and fast results. The informant
meant  that  Vietnam as  a  medium-income  nation  does  not  have  the  sufficient
economy, technological assets or know-how to give quick and satisfactory results.
However, along with interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO), they stressed that Vietnam
is working as hard as possible to live up to the EU’s requests, even though it takes
time to reach every fisherman.
“The  first  time  when  they  (EU)  do  the  warning  they  require  about  9  different
recommendations that they want Vietnam and its fisheries to improve. And from other non-
state actors we see that government work very seriously on all the recommendations.”
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“Some of the fishermen maybe find it (IUU policy implementation) too difficult to cope with.
[…] The cooperation motivation from the fishermen is not high because they don’t see the
motivation in the big picture yet. The government sees the big picture that if the yellow card
is released the fishery of Vietnam can grow, but the single individual fisherman needs time to
understand  that.”
– Interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO)
They further explained that the issues of IUU fishing had been a daily subject of
the news and conversations for a long time, placing the issue in the collective
consciousness of the people. This being due to the information campaigns running
to raise public awareness about the problems of IUU fishery. The information
campaign only recently stopped due to COVID-19.  The Vietnamese informants
brought up the information campaign as a reason for the lack of protests against
the new regulations, something which happened in the nearby nation of Thailand
whom recently had their yellow card revoked.
Interview 2 (FAO) discussed that civil society and trends are able to affect IUU
fishery through various kinds of incentivization. 
“It is a lot about incentives. At the end of the day, if you have the right incentives, things will
probably happen. […] How can you just ask someone to stop their livelihood if you don’t
offer anything better? Because at the end of the day they have to feed their families, and if
you interview a lot of artisanal fishers who practice illegal fishing, one answer is ‘I have to
feed my family.’ The other is that in some cases fishers are banned without having the proper
assessments etc. without involving them in the process. So, if there is a rule that they don’t
agree to they will not follow it. If there is a rule that does not offer an incentive they will not
follow  it  either,  so  that  itself  becomes  an  incentive  to  enter  into  IUU.”
– Interview 3 (FAO)
“In many countries  nowadays in the world,  regardless  of  being developed or developing
countries,  we are starting to see a lot  of  trends particularly in  restaurants of  chefs  only
serving  sustainable  fish.”
– Interview 2 (FAO)
If there is an incentive to supply non-IUU fish products due to a paying market,
they argued, more IUU-certified fish will enter the market. Another example was
how women clam-fishers in Indonesia were able to multiply their income after
learning that the major demand was in large specimens, and that leaving smaller
specimens  in  the  sea  will  secure  their  livelihoods  in  the  future.  By providing
information and an economical incentive, the life cycle of clams and information
about the market demands and supply chains, a more sustainable mode of clam
fishing was achieved alongside the fishers becoming more likely to follow the
rules. The transmission of ideas and definitions is an, if not the most, important
part of combating IUU. In a similar manner, Interview 3 (FAO) further discussed
that  if  a  system is  introduced to  a  group of  people,  there  must  be a  level  of
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understanding and mutual trust between all the groups involved. They continued
that such a thing may be achieved by allowing a distribution of power between
institutions and local civil society. 
As the locals often hold innate knowledge of their area and their resources, they
may know details that higher administrative levels do not. Just the same may be
said of the opposite, the higher institutions may not know the details but have a
more overarching view of the subject. Purely top-down decisions may not have
the  desired  effects,  as  the  people  expected  to  conform  to  the  new  rules  or
programs  may  ignore  them  if  they  do  not  see  the  reason  for  following  the
demands. A close cooperation would lead to higher trust and make the project
more likely to succeed. Finally, interviewee 4 (FAO) explained that IUU fishing
will not go away completely.
My opinion is it (IUU fishery) will never end. […] Even if you put a faraway target in terms
of time, say 2050, I think we can try to look forward to reducing drastically this happening,
and controlling and making sure we’re having a culture of  compliance so that fishermen
understand that it is for their well-being and for future generations that they reduce it as
much as possible. But, stealing will always exist. It has existed in the past and will exist in the
future. […] We can reduce, we can control and make things much better, but it will never
end.
– Interview 4 (FAO)
The  argument  is  that  we  may  reduce  it  drastically,  but  there  will  always  be
opportunists or those who must commit IUU or stealing to support themselves.
However,  the  amount  of  such  things  happening  can  be  mitigated  if  the
surrounding culture becomes one of compliance to rules, where noncompliance is
commonly unaccepted. Thus the amount of institutionalized and normalized IUU
fishery would be reduced.
6.1.4 Discussion
The questions,  issues  and solutions  presented  and proposed by representatives
from different  areas  of  expertise  and  different  backgrounds  are  demonstrably
varied. While they may be similar in some areas, they are still distinct enough to
show  how  possible  failures  in  communication  may  appear.  This  makes  the
inherent  relativism of the issues of IUU visible,  as the different  priorities  and
talking points reflect  the values internalized by different people from different
backgrounds. Furthermore, the internalized values that shape the discussion are
affected by the roles and experiences of the informants themselves, as well as the
organizations they associate with. 
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As discussed in section 2.4, the EU is actively expanding certain norms regarding
the use and government of resources. This means that the European norms are
being spread with the goal of being assimilated into other cultures which may
hold vastly different interpretations or values related to the subjects in question.
By using the theory of cultural relativity we are able to see how the relativity of
interpretation of different subjects becomes apparent. In this case, the norms of
the EU are to be accepted by a counterpart  who may or may not hold certain
values or interpretations that the EU takes for granted. This begs the question: is
the EU interested in knowing if the transferred norms will  be accepted by the
receiving actor in a positive or negative manner? 
According to the material published by the EU, the carding policy is ultimately
based on good intentions. This goal of sustainability of the oceans ties into the
United  Nations  Sustainable  Development  Goal  number  14,  which  means  to
conserve marine ecosystems and resources in a sustainable manner. What we can
see from the interviews and material is that the cards are generally seen as a good
idea,  but  not  altruistic.  The  positives  on  a  national  and  overall  level  are  not
necessarily as positive for the local or small scale level, at least not immediately
or in the short term. From a relativistic standpoint, this means that policy makers
must  be  aware  of  whether  they  and  the  people  they  affect  are  seeing  and
discussing a 6 or 9 (see illustration 2). It is easy to discuss the same subjects and
words while being unaware that the other holds a different interpretation of the
situation and discussion. Therefore it may be more effective to be prepared for
misinterpretations, but also take precautions so that the risk of misunderstandings
and/or miscommunication may be as small as possible. 
In the case of the EU’s carding policy, the final decision in revoking or escalating
a card falls to the EU. This means that it is important that the EU and the other
nation, in this case Vietnam, have a common understanding of the subject and all
of its implications. If the EU were to lead by example with methods inapplicable
to  Vietnam’s  situation,  such  an  example  would  fall  flat.  We  can  see  the
acknowledgment  of  this  from  the  Vietnamese  side  by  how  the  informants
described  follow-up  meetings  with  the  EU  as  well  as  information  campaigns
meant to further develop the card revocation requirements and spread the desired
common  interpretations  of  IUU  fishery  and  its  implications.  However,  as
following  chapters  will  discuss,  there  is  still  much  work  to  be  done  on  the
international scene to coordinate terminology and actions before actors may come
to agreement. 
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6.2 How does the normative power of the European 
Union become apparent through the lens of IUU fishery 
policies?
This chapter will discuss how the normative power of the EU is made apparent
through the  interviews. The  EU has  since  its  conception  employed  normative
power  on  it’s  own  member  states,  meant  to  normalize  a  state  of  peace  and
adherence to the supranational laws enacted by the union parliament in Brussels.
Looking at trade negotiations and the carding policies of the EU it is possible to
see that  the EU is  attempting  to expand its  own norms to its  trading partners
through the market. By requesting certain regulations,  the EU injects  its ideals
into another nation’s consciousness with the goal of turning these ideas into the
internalized universal norms of the subjected nation (Manners 2002). 
6.2.1 Cards: carrots and sticks
This chapter will discuss how the carding policy may be interpreted based on the
interviews. As mentioned in the previous chapter: the commonly agreed themes
brought up, discussed and illustrated in a majority of the interviews were 1) IUU
has to be prevented, and 2) IUU is everyone’s problem. If one looks at the carding
policy as if they were a carrot or stick one may notice they are a bit of both.
Successful changes and reforms promise rewards through continued cooperation,
trade and sustainability while sanctions lurk on the horizon if the work was to fail.
The use of economic repercussions or inconveniences in regards to IUU fishery is
not exclusive to the EU’s carding policies. The Port State Measures Agreement
(PSMA) which is the only binding and regulated policy by the FAO is another
example.
“The idea of the PSMA is to create a financial burden for IUU fishing. The idea is that the
product which is originated from IUU fishing is going to very difficult to be unloaded in any
port  of  any  significant  party.”
– Interview 2 (FAO)
One fact about the cards and the system that is important to bring up is:  “They
(EU cards) create movement”  (interview 10, UK NGO).  The informant argued
that  by  applying  pressure  to  the  market,  the  card  creates  incentives  for
governments to change their policies, and it is quite effective at doing so. Even
after a card has been revoked, the continued threat of a new card theoretically
means that regulations are kept. The cards being applied as a “carrot and stick” is
effective, explained the informant, as it provides both an incentive to cooperate
and possible  punishment  for  declining.  As  such it  is  a  very  effective  way of
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changing  the  methods  and  behavior  of  another  actor.  This  indicates  that  the
carding in itself does not change the norms. The implications are rather that the
EU sees itself as a normative power through being powerful and -knowing- that
their advice is good.
6.2.2 What one says, what one does and what one says one 
does
In the following section, I will discuss how the EU’s own fishery is interpreted
and reflected in the way the informants discuss the international policies. Three
interviewees (1 & 2 from the FAO and 10 from the UK NGO) discussed how the
policies  and  standards  of  the  European  Union’s  cards  were  in  some  ways
hypocritical. During interview 1 it was discussed that the carding policies request
a carded nation patrol their waters to prevent IUU fishery. However, EU member
states themselves do not patrol their waters in a way that completely prevents IUU
fishery, as the cost of oil they would have to spend would overshadow the income
of their fishing industry. Thus, while the economic implications of such a system
are unsustainable within the European Union, the EU asks its trading partners to
do so. 
“The capacity to patrol a 200-mile limit is zero in most of these countries in Southeast Asia. I
mean, even in Europe the ability to patrol effectively a 200 mile economic zone is almost
impossible.  […]  The  global  expectation  that  is  placed  on  countries  that  are  developing
countries with very very limited resources, that they would commit their whole navy to just
patrolling and protecting perhaps a few tons or a couple hundred or thousand tons of fish,
which is worth maybe a million dollars, but you spend maybe five, ten, twenty, thirty million
dollars  in  fuel  and  vessels,  why  would  you  do  that?”
– Interview 1 (FAO)
Interview 2 (FAO) explained that the development of modern fisheries in the EU
was made possible through what is now considered unsustainable methods. The
fishery within the EU was supported by the state  through subsidies  and fixed
prices, which led to strong growth and powerful markets. It was after allowing the
fishery  industries  to  establish  themselves  economically  that  the  global  north
moved to more sustainable methods.  However,  the interviewee also explained,
there  are  controversies  regarding  the  sustainability  of  EU fishery.  They again
brought up the example about how the EU pays to conduct fishery off the coast of
northern Africa. 
“If  you  think  of  the  fishery  access  agreements  that  the  EU has  with,  basically,  African
countries. That they pay a fixed sum of money to the country to allow them to fish off the
coast  of  the  country  is  also  very  criticized.”
– Interview 2 (FAO)
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This fishery is controversial as it can be argued it pays into corruption and builds
on unsustainable quotas, as well as possibly using unsustainable fishing gear. The
case of EU fishery off the coast of Africa was also brought up during the tenth
interview. 
“Our (EU) own fleets: Spain, France, Italy, the UK have huge problems. We fish off the coast
of Africa, we conduct IUU fishing, we deplete resources, we use unsustainable gears. […] We
haven’t  sorted  out  our  own  fisheries.”
– Interview 10 (UK NGO)
Interviewee  10  (UK  NGO)  further  discussed  the  method  with  which  the
recommendations  and  requests  were  relayed  from the  European  Union  to  the
carded nation. According to the interviewee, who had observed EU delegations
visiting  Thailand,  the  delegations  consisted  of  older  European men who often
were not invested in the local conditions of the nation they were visiting.  The
informant described that the delegations’ propositions were often “whimsical” and
“ad-hoc”  in  nature,  sometimes  completely  unrelated  to  local  conditions  or
possibilities.  Finally  interviews  1,  5,  6  and 7 (FAO, Vietnamese  and Swedish
NGO and GOs) all brought up that the fishing fleets of the EU are quite different
from  many  other  nations’,  including  those  carded,  yet  the  original  requested
changes following the carding would not take those differences into consideration.
One of the requirements of the EU was that all catch had to be documented and certified as
being not-from-IUU fishing. The issue is that the way that fishing occurs in Southeast Asia is
that you have very, very large fleets of small vessels. Something that the EU does not have.
[…] When you have a hundred small-scale vessels bringing stuff into port, what you have is a
huge combination of catches and grading. Because, the quality stuff that you want to export
maybe comes from 50 of the boats, and is only maybe 5% or 10% or 20% of the overall catch.
[…] You’ve  got  a  hundred  vessels  and you’re  splitting  your  catch  certificate  into  three,
suddenly you have 300 catch certificates. That then goes into the catch from four other ports
that goes to a processing factory, suddenly they have 1000 catch certificates. All of that has
to accompany any product that is then delivered out in a container to the EU, and may go
through 3 or 4 different channels, those catch certificates have to then follow that and be split
again. […] The EU brought out this regulation and straight away the countries said ‘this is
absolute  madness.’”
– Interview 1 (FAO)
Anthropologist Margret Mead has been ascribed with saying “What people say,
what people do and what people say they do are entirely different things.”1 In the
case of the cards, one may argue that the requested norms are set by an ideal
rather than by example. The norm is based on the powerful definition of the norm
though they are not an example of it.  The disregard of local conditions and the
assumption that one’s own conditions are the standard adds to the theory of the
1There is no written source for this citation, however it is most often ascribed to her.
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norm being established, defined and enforced by the powerful. Furthermore,  the
power  to  dictate  the  norm is  a  show of  general  power  as  it  was  defined  by
Foucault. 
Something that may be of interest to note is that the experience of hypocrisy came
entirely from the western interviewees. Locals instead spoke about the demands
and their  implication  on the  Vietnamese  context,  rather  than  reflecting  on the
EU’s own practices.
6.2.3 The nature of demands
“It’s interesting to think that, since the regulatory environment of fisheries in the world is a
little bit soft and voluntary in nature, many countries that have a strategic interest in fishery
try to impose their values and principles that they apply to fisheries to other countries.”
– Interview 2 (FAO)
This section discusses the experienced relations between the EU and third nations
in regards to the power dynamics between them. When discussing the case of
Vietnam’s carding, some interviews brought up the issue of uneven discussions
regarding IUU policy changes. The carding policy is presented by the EU as a
cooperation towards a sustainable future, better practices and the better health for
marine ecosystems. As it is presented in an easily available info-graphic “Thanks
to this cooperation, more than 30 third countries have improved their systems to
fight IUU” (European Commission 2015). The cards are, in short, presented as a
method to enable global cooperation. However, interviewee 5 (Vietnamese NGO)
explained  that,  as  the  EU  initiated  the  conversation  and  investigation  about
Vietnamese IUU fishery, the European Union has the power to continue it until
they  are  satisfied.  This  implies  that  the  EU  not  only  has  control  of  the
conversation, they also have the power to define when and if the demands are met.
Furthermore, Interviewee 6 (Vietnamese GO) explained that the original policy
and  regulatory  changes  proposed  by the  EU were  not  adapted  to  the  case  of
Vietnam.  The  original  requested  changes  were  very  large  and  difficult  to
implement as the policies used within the EU were built around a different system
of fishing fleets and a different diversity and multitude of catches. 
Interviewee 5 (Vietnamese NGO) further explained that the terminology used by
Vietnam and the EU were not coordinated. For example: the phrase “community”
and “local people” have a different meaning in Vietnam compared to the EU. 
“We focus on the life and livelihoods of the local peoples. But when I’m talking about the
community, the local people, it may be different perspectives. In Sweden, in Europe, when
you’re talking about the communities it may include the people in the urban- or in the areas
of advantage, but here we are talking about the poor, the poorest and the most vulnerable as
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communities.”
– Interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO)
This  makes  discussions  between  Vietnam  and  the  EU  delegations  become
complicated  because  the  differences  are  significant  enough  to  cause
misunderstandings. Further complications arise in how the Vietnamese are more
open  with  information  about  the  issue  than  the  EU.  These  issues  may  be
interpreted as the European Union not fully involving or explaining themselves to
the nation involved. The use of words and definitions are not adapted to the nation
they enter into discussions with but are rather universally applied out of their own
definitions, which are assumed to be the norm. This once again ties into both the
transference of normative power and the norms being defined by the powerful, as
the  implied  norms  of  the  EU are  expected  to  be  universal.  Relating  back  to
normative relativism, interview 7 (Swedish GO) discussed how the terminology
and policies of the EU are adapted to the premise of European fishery. The EU’s
fleets consist of fewer and larger boats than Vietnam, but even the small vessels
are  better  equipped  and more  knowledgeable  about  rules  and regulations  than
many  other  areas  of  the  globe.  The  rules  and  regulations  within  the  EU  are
adapted to this specific scenario, however even here they are not foolproof. Due to
the legislation being so well  understood by fishers within the union,  there are
those who will thread the needle and do exactly as much as they can get away
with, even modifying their boats if needed to fit into less regulated classes. 
The quote “It’s hard because we are a developing country” was mentioned in a
previous section. As this phrase was repeated multiple times throughout interview
6, it may be interpreted as signalling an implied hierarchy, where Vietnam is in a
much lower position than the EU. Based on the short duration of the interview
there is no way of knowing if it was the internalized world-view of the informant.
Assuming it were, however, it would mean that the inherent inferiority embedded
into the title of being a “developing” country as opposed to “developed” countries
has become normalized. What this means is that a “developing country” cannot be
expected to do the same things or uphold the same standards as a “developed
nation”.  
6.2.4 Discussion
The normative power of the EU is, based on the interpretation of the material
provided,  to  present  what  they  define  as  the  “normal”  way  of  interpreting  a
sustainable  fishery  industry  to  another  nation,  even if  they  themselves  do  not
fulfill all their own criteria. In this case the norm is not presented by example, but
rather an image of an ideal model presented by a powerful actor. While many
aspects in the ideal are apparent in reality,  there are also claims that bring the
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EU’s  ideal  into  question.  However,  due  to  the  power held  by  the  EU on the
international scale, it  is possible for the European Union to deliberately apply,
present and spread the ideal  norm, as has been shown previously by  Manners
(2002). This is strengthened by how multiple informants described differences in
terminology and consideration for local conditions. Finally, the norms of the EU
and  their  international  diffusion  come  to  light  in  the  discussion  about
“developing”  and “developed” nations.  This  differentiation  between perceiving
oneself as a “developing” compared to a “developed country in the discussion
about the former reaching the standards of the latter may be interpreted as a way
of diffusing the normative power of the EU, by fitting oneself into a place in the
hierarchy.
Based on both previous studies and the interviews conducted during this study I,
the author, interpret that the threat of economic and trade repercussions may- and
has  led  to  normalization  of  new polices.  While  not  exclusive  to  the  EU,  the
message and policies brought forward by them, and the inherent values contained
in the conditions for continued trade,  are based on the norms of the European
Union.  The spreading of  norms appears  to  be conducted  in  good faith  as  the
motivation is based on cooperation towards a more sustainable future ocean life
and us humans as a species. The promotions of ones norms for the purpose of
correcting what one believes is wrong in the world is inherently a good idea, as
the goal is a more positive future. There is however a proverb that says “the road
to hell  is  paved with good intentions”.  This could mean one must explore the
possibilities and hardships that may arise during implementation before one even
begins. From this and previous studies, we may see that the use of market power
has  the  side  effect  of  reinforcing  international  hierarchies  based  on economic
differences and the definition of being “developed” and “developing” as a nation.
The norms of the powerful are what dictates an acceptable implementation of the
requested policy changes, and thus the same norms become assimilated into the
other’s mode of thought. Whether the norms stay after implementation is another
question entirely, but they are introduced to a new population through the changes
in policy.
IUU  fishery  being  reduced  through  building  a  “culture  of  compliance”  was
mentioned in a quote from Interview 4 in a previous chapter. This becomes more
relevant in the discussion of normativity as the ideals and norms of a culture are
what  controls  how the people  who have internalized  the  norms interpret  their
world. One may argue that the EU’s carding policies are in a way building an
international culture of compliance to a standardized set of rules meant to become
a general set of international  norms. As seen in the literature review there are
multiple  studies  on  the  EU’s  international  normative  policies  being  spread
internationally, but there is also one interesting study relating to Vietnam on the
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nature of legal compliance written by Boonstra & Nguyen (2010). In their study
they discuss how non-compliance to the Vietnamese laws of fishery is a historical
and cultural fact, and at times a necessity to prevent someone else from taking
their  share.  This provides a  background to the issues of IUU fishery and also
provides an interesting point of view relating to a quote from interview 3: “… If
you interview a lot of artisanal fishers who practice illegal fishing, one answer (to
why) is  ‘I  have to feed my family.’” This quote and the previously mentioned
study shows that  the culture surrounding IUU fishery is  complicated,  and that
there is a lot at stake from ending the practice. That is not to say that IUU fishery
is something positive, but rather that for some it has become a necessity due to the
tragedy of the commons.
6.3 How does the discussion about IUU fishery policy 
reflect international power relations?
This section will discuss which power relations became the most apparent through
the conducted discourse analysis. Exercise of power comes in many shapes and is
practiced over a broad spectrum of scales. When a major international actor like
the EU interacts with a smaller actor their power scales are seldom even. This
sub-chapter presents the discursive power relations gathered from the interviews
by  relating  to  Hirdman’s  and  Foucault’s  power  relations,  Spiro’s  normative
relativity and partially to the concept of conflict. 
6.3.1 The power to dictate the norm
This chapter  discusses how the normative power of the EU is legitimized and
therefore implementable. There are many ways to exert power, but as previously
quoted:  “the  ability  to  define  what  passes  for  ‘normal’  in  world  politics  is,
ultimately, the greatest power of all” (Manners 2002). In the case of the cards, the
power lies in market and economical demands. Hirdman writes that the powerful
dictate the norms, and the norms set by the powerful are seen as good while others
are  inferior  (Hirdman  1988).  Furthermore,  according  to  Foucault  (1978):  the
exercise of power is always conscious. In the case of the EU, this applies not least
to the selection of which countries they may issue a card to. The application of the
EU’s market power is an active choice. According to a pair of interviewees there
are nations that should be issued cards, but the EU does not. Informant 10 (UK
NGO) explained that there are nations who deserve cards but for some reason are
never  spoken  about,  and  rather  that  the  issuing  of  cards  is  unpredictable.
Informant 1 went deeper and said that the nations whom have been carded so far
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are mostly minor actors on the global scale, and even though China and India
conduct unsustainable fishery they will never get a yellow or red card. 
Two countries that would be interesting targets for carding have never had a card and in fact
the EU will never go near it. One of those is China and the other one’s India. [...] They (EU)
have only really issued red cards to countries that have such minimal amounts of trade with
the  EU  that  it’s  not  an  issue.
– Interview 1 (FAO)
These points are reinforced by the EU’s own list of carded nations, where only
five of the twenty six carded nations are classified as high-income. Furthermore,
only two of which have relatively substantial international representation, namely
Taiwan and South Korea (European Commission n.d.). Finally, the only nations to
have been blacklisted are low and medium income countries. 
The  selectivity  of  the  EU’s  carding  practices  may  be  tied  to  how  Foucault
describes power as being given from the bottom up, where those who perceive
themselves as lower in a hierarchy legitimize those they believe to have power
over them. Since power is also consciously practiced with aims and goals, and the
EU’s IUU regulation policies have the clear aim to influence international IUU
issues,  one  may question  why this  is.  An explanation  could  be  that  the  EU’s
assertion of power is being legitimized by less economically developed or less
internationally  represented nations,  which ultimately may accept  and allow the
EU to present their norms as an example to follow. Using the same logic, one may
argue that the EU is not being given power by India and China, and is therefore
not able to assert power over the two nations. If the power is not given to the EU,
the power cannot be applied. 
6.3.2 The power in cooperation
This chapter will discuss the positive possibilities and points regarding the carding
policies. When looking at material  published by the EU regarding IUU fishery
one may find that the reasoning behind the carding policies is not one of malice.
Documents  published  by  the  EU  rather  show  that  the  carding  policies  were
created  to  preserve  marine  ecosystems  and  promote  global  partnership.  As  is
stated  in  one  of  the  info-graphics  available  on  the  European  Commission's
website: “Thanks to this cooperation, more than 30 third countries have improved
their systems to fight IUU” (European Commission 2015). Similar to how number
17  of  the  United  Nations’  sustainable  development  goals  aims  to  promote
international  partnership and cooperation  (United Nations n.d.) and number 14
aims to promote a sustainable use of the oceans (United Nations n.d.), the material
presented by the EU aims to show that the carding policy is a positive way to
promote  international  sustainability  and  partnership.  Many  of  the  conducted
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interviews  touched  on  themes  of  sustainable  development  and  its  use  in
discussions. 
The communication between the EU and the state of Vietnam paints a picture of
international cooperation and mutual benefit, but at the same time the EU holds a
significant part of Vietnamese fishery’s profits in its hand, and if their demands
are not met they are able to financially damage Vietnam as a repercussion. This
begs the question: if the EU is asking Vietnam to cooperate or face a figurative
embargo, is it really a partnership?
The power dynamics of IUU policy cooperation are an intricate matter, but the
interviews provide a certain picture.  According to informant  1 (FAO), the EU
does indeed wish to have more sustainable imports, but at the same time does not
want to lose its trading partners. 
“The EU itself has to balance the problem of: if they block the entry of products they are
disadvantaging  those  companies  that  rely  on  that  product  within  the  EU.”
– Interview 1 (FAO)
Thus, as quoted in the previous section, the cards are only applied to nations by
which the EU’s market would be minimally affected by a blacklisting or red card.
This does, however, conflict with the case of Thailand’s carding. Interviews 10, 9,
8 and 7 (UK and Swedish NGOs and GO) all showed that Thailand is a major
processor  in  preserved  marine  products,  and  thus  the  EU would  lose  a  large
portion of fishery products from Southeast Asia and Oceania if a red card or a
blacklisting had been issued. This being the case, there must be something more
to  the  selectivity  of  carding  rather  than  a  calculated  power  play.  Interview 2
(FAO) brought up that “The fish is only a national product after you catch the fish
and bring it onto a fishing vessel.” Furthermore they argued that, as fish and other
marine life move effortlessly between national borders, it  is not possible for a
single nation to hold full responsibility for the sustainability of its marine flora
and fauna. Cooperation between nations thus becomes key, as the only way to
secure one’s own assets, which are fluid, are to make sure ones neighbours’ assets
are healthy and sustainable as well. 
One may ask how the previous section relates to power dynamics, but it is quite
simply  about  incentives.  Interview  3  (FAO)  stated  that  top-down  decisions
without a cooperative mindset regarding regulations or policy changes will never
be as effective as when those affected by the proposed change are involved and
allowed  to  understand  or  influence  the  decisions.  If  a  person  is  allowed  to
interpret  and  understand  their  situation  and  the  reasoning  behind  proposed
changes, and how they may be positively affected by the changes, they will be
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more  inclined  to  cooperate.  If,  using  an  example  presented  in  interview  7
(Swedish GO), 
“If you have an area where there is a traditional fishery community in Vietnam, they are
often affected (by IUU fishery) by how large ships don’t follow the rules and fish by the coast.
Then when Vietnam uses their patrol boats to find these ships, it’s often because the locals
have called because they have been given a task to do so, and they make sure the large ships
respect  the  boundaries.”
– Interview 7 (Swedish GO)
Multiple  interviewees  mentioned  that  Vietnam  is  very  open  to  international
cooperation and do wish to work towards a more sustainable  fishery industry.
This is further enforced by the fact that Vietnam had already implemented policy
changes regarding IUU fishery before the yellow card was issued  (Ngo 2014).
This situation, applied to an international level rather than local, was described by
one  informant  when  expressing  hope  that  the  Vietnamese  government  had
managed to establish such a relation to the European Commission. However, who
decides what “cooperation” is? Interviewee 5 (Vietnamese NGO) said:
It  looks  like  that  the  European  Commission  is  in  the  position  of  the  one  who comes  to
investigate and Vietnam is in the position of people who have to respond to that investigation.
[…] EU is the one to initiate the conversation, right? And Vietnam has no way but to respond
to that because we need the EU as a partner in trade. I hope that our government is strong
enough, that our fishermen are strong enough, so that we also have our point to make and a
more  equal  position  to  discuss.
– Interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO)
By initiating the discussion and issuing the card, the EU has actively practiced
power.  Furthermore,  by  holding  the  right  to  decide  the  dichotomy  of  the
cooperation’s success or failure, the union further enforces its position of power.
While assuming a role of an international  actor working towards a sustainable
future, the EU is perceived as being well aware of the power it holds through its
market.
6.3.3 The power of power
Finally,  this  section will  discuss the significance of power itself  in  relation  to
policy  implementation.  A  recurring  theme  throughout  the  discussions  and
literature is change, and power is made visible in different ways in the discussions
about the changes necessary for IUU policy implementation.
As power is given from the bottom up, those who hold power are dependent on
those  they  assert  it  over  for  legitimacy.  The  power  of  the  European  Union’s
market is dependent on the dependency of the trade partner’s market. In the case
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of Vietnam, interview 6 explained that the European Union purchases one third of
Vietnamese marine products yearly.  That  alone is  an incentive for Vietnam to
uphold their  relations  and trade partnership with the EU, which empowers the
latter. It is not the first time change through market pressure have been employed
by the EU. The neighbouring country of Thailand is a recent example presented
by multiple interviewees. Interviews 8, 9 and 10 presented different angles of the
Thai process of losing their yellow card, the former two being more general and
the latter more in depth. 
“Thailand is in itself a success story.  And it’s like they jokingly say some times, that it’s
thanks  to  the  military  regime,  because  otherwise  they  wouldn’t  be  able  to  make  all  the
changes.”
– Interview 9 (Swedish NGO)
Interview 10 gave the impression that the Thai negotiations with the EU were
lopsided  and  the  power  was  unbalanced,  where  the  representatives  from  the
European Union were less knowledgeable about local possibilities and challenges
while  still  holding power over the Thai  representatives.  Quoting interview 10:
“Basically the EU would say ‘jump’, and Thailand would be like ‘how high?’”.
Based on interviews 5 and 6, the situation in Vietnam may be similar. Interviewee
5 had been involved in the issue and explained that the original demands from the
EU were not adapted to the Vietnamese situation. The shape of the fishing fleet,
the infrastructure, the terminology or the wide range of marine fauna caught in
Vietnam but not present in the EU market had to be explained for the new policies
to be shaped in a viable manner. Further, Interviewee 5 expressed hope that the
Vietnamese  government  had  managed  to  establish  a  more  equal  platform  for
negotiations than it was when the yellow card was originally issued. This may be
interpreted as not wishing to give up as much power to the EU as the image of
Thailand gives. 
There is also the discussion of practising the power one holds locally. Interview 8
presented a pair  of anecdote  regarding the power of the Thai  and Vietnamese
government in regards to changing policies. Thailand, explained the interviewee,
had policies that prevented any rapid changes and caused such issues that the Thai
carding  situation  nearly  escalated  into  a  red  card.  However,  a  military  coup
allowed the then provisional government to completely reform the bureaucracy
surrounding fishery issues, and while unpopular,  allowed the Thais  to actively
work towards the EU demands. In the case of Vietnam the interviewee explained
that for a very long time nobody would wear a helmet  when riding a bike or
motorcycle.  Even though the law stated one must wear a helmet,  the law was
neither respected nor enforced. However, once the government decided the law
should be enforced by the police it only took a matter of days before all bikers
wore  helmets.  Interviewee  8  explained  that  the  same  situation  has  happened
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multiple times and that the Vietnamese government has such an absolute control
that  they  may  be  able  to  end  IUU  fishery  fairly  quickly  should  they  wish.
However, it was also mentioned that it takes a long time to reach that point. These
anecdotes illustrate that extreme power, when exerted in force,  may create  the
change one wants in a relatively short time frame.
6.3.4 Discussion
Manners (2002) argues that the EU does not use coercion towards its partners
when spreading its norms. However, multiple interviewees brought up the power
of the international market, and its use as a bargaining point. While the EU does
not threaten or coerce its partners, the pressure of lost income may work in its
place.  Furthermore,  sustainable  development  is  currently a powerful  argument.
The power of the EU and Vietnam is influenced not only by the market, but also
how one’s image may appear internationally if one were to argue against the EU’s
definition of sustainability. The power of the market thus ties into the normative
power of the EU. While definitions, methods and priorities may vary globally,
they must be synchronized when two actors cooperate. As the material shows, the
resulting norm of the cooperation is heavily influenced by the actor holding more
power.
Returning to the definition of power in section 5.3 the Foucauldian part states that:
power  is  always  given  from the  bottom upwards,  power  is  practiced  and  the
practice  of  power  is  always  deliberate.  This  begs  the  questions:  1)  “what
motivates Vietnam to give power to the EU?” and 2) “what motivates the EU to
practice  power  on  Vietnam?”  A  simple  answer  to  the  former,  which  is
strengthened by several  informants,  is  that  the  EU is  such a  large  market  for
Vietnamese marine products that the economic incentive of keeping them as a
trade  partner  and  that  Vietnam  has  more  to  lose  from  conflict  rather  than
appeasement. Informant 6 (Vietnamese GO) said that the EU’s imports amount to
one third of Vietnamese yearly exports of marine products. Losing such a partner
may mean a large economic loss for a nation’s economy, and thus it would be in
one’s  own best  interest  to  do  what  one  can  to  keep  it.  To put  it  simply:  by
legitimizing  and following the  requests  of  their  trade  partner,  and thus  giving
them  power,  Vietnam  is  more  likely  to  retain  economic  stability.  A  similar
argument was shown in interview 5 (Vietnamese NGO). However, the EU is also
actively taking advantage of their given power by issuing the cards and making
their requests. In fact, issuing a card to a nation which does not give power to the
EU  would  be  a  wasted  effort.  As  Informants  1  (FAO)  and  10  (UK  NGO)
discussed,  India  and China  are  both nations  with  large  fleets  conducting  IUU
fishery, yet the EU does not issue them any cards as they are not given the power
to do so. In the case of China it may be argued that the EU is in the same seat as
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Vietnam as the dependent party. However, the two nations India and China are
not as dependent on marine exports to the EU as Vietnam is. This means that the
EU’s practice of power focuses on those partners they know they have the power
to  influence.  In  an info-graphic  provided on the  European Commission's  IUU
website  (European  Commission  2015) they  state  that  the  goal  of  the  carding
policy is to promote international cooperation for more sustainable fishery and
marine management. Thus, to answer the second question: the EU practices their
power on Vietnam because they have both been given the power to do so and
have interest in spreading their policies of sustainability. 
Through  the  previous  arguments  I  see  how the  EU  carding  policy  is  in  part
motivated  by  power  itself.  Continuing  to  the  second  part  of  the  definition  of
power.  By  assuming  the  culturally  relative  view  that  actions  are  primarily
practiced in the interest of doing morally good in the context of one’s own world
view, and the assumption that the actor with power interprets themselves and are
interpreted by others as the example of norms which are good and right, the EU
gains  a  further  motivation  for  their  carding  policies.  Informant  2  (FAO)
mentioned that many nations with an interest in fisheries try to spread their norms
to others due to demands from civil society or political interest. In the case of the
EU one may argue both. As the EU holds internal norms, both through legislation
and through demands from civil  society,  which specify how fishery should be
conducted, and through the assumption that these norms are good, they have an
interest in making sure their imports follow their norms so that the products are
also good. If we add that the EU’s cards are also an action justified by the concept
of sustainability, which is a hot topic in the current international discourse, the
legitimacy of the goodness of the norms are further strengthened. In short, through
this theoretical combination we see that the power given to the EU legitimizes
their  position  as  a  normative  example,  which  further  legitimizes  their  goal  of
spreading their norms of sustainable fishery management.
6.4 On discourse
In this last section of chapter 6 the discourse surrounding the previous questions
and  points  is  discussed.  Power,  normativity  and  cultural  relativity  are  three
separate themes that are also interconnected and in some ways dependent on each
other. This becomes apparent when applied in the context of IUU fishery and the
yellow card issued to Vietnam. By analysing the interviews through the lenses of
Hirdman’s  and  Foucault’s  power  dynamics,  Spiro’s  definition  of  cultural
normative relativity and Manners’ definition of normative power, one may find
three  connections:  1)  power relations  dictate  the acceptance  of  norms and the
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subjects of discussions, 2) the norms dictate power relations and the discussions,
3) the discussions make the power and norms become visible. 
The power distribution and norms become visible through the language used by
informants during interviews in multiple ways. One is by analysing the opinions
and explanations presented by the interviewees. Much of the discussion of power
was obtained in this way. However, in the context of this paper and through the
application  of  discourse  analysis,  the  subjects  and  stories  brought  up  by
informants become contextually important and show significant information by
themselves. Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the informants
were given some leeway in which part of IUU fishery they wished to discuss and
where they wanted to take the subject.  This means that the subjects discussed
during the interviews were partly due to the informants’ own associations  and
world-views  (Foucault  1981),  which  in  turn  becomes  representative  of  their
internalized discourses. This is how one finds the norms and normative powers at
play  within  the  discussion.  Finding  the  common  themes  between  informants
working in similar fields but in different departments, associations, companies or
nations  provides  an  insight  into  the  norms  commonly  accepted  in  a  certain
subject. In short: through analysis of both the said and the unsaid, the underlying
discourses surrounding the yellow card have become apparent. 
Throughout  this  study,  discourse  analysis  has  made  it  possible  to  uncover
differences and similarities in the way yellow cards, the EU, Vietnam and IUU
fishery are discussed. Assuming that what people say, what they do and what they
say they  do are different  things,  the  discourse  analysis  allows us  to  see what
people say and what they say they do. This allows the researcher to gain insight
into a situation and the narratives and norms that  surround it.  In this  case the
Vietnamese yellow card is shown to be a part of a global issue, and an example of
how power dynamics and normativity is shaped on the international and global
scale.  By  studying  the  interviewees’  points  of  interest,  which  subjects  they
spontaneously bring up and what they leave unsaid, has enabled the application of
the theories used in this thesis.  
Discourse analysis, however, limits the information available in a study as it is
dependent on written and spoken language. As previously mentioned, words have
different values and meanings for different people, and the inherent message of a
written or spoken statement may be interpreted differently by different  people.
Thus, to understand what a person really means one must understand the person
themselves,  and  preferably  their  native  language.  The  lack  of  complementary
observation, which would show what people do compared to what they say and
what they say they do, and quantitative data complicates the reproducibility of the
study. A discourse analysis is ultimately dependent on the interpretations of the
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author. While using a reflexive stance and discussing to oneself why and how one
has reached the conclusions and interpretations one has made, it is inevitable that
one’s own internalized views, norms and interpretations will show.
6.5 A personal reflection on cards, policies and ethics
In this section I, the author, will be discussing my own opinions and thoughts on
the matter of carding as a policy and its implications. Throughout the work on my
thesis I have learned that the world of fisheries, geopolitics and international trade
are deeply intertwined in ways I previously had no idea about. I have throughout
my  studies  found  things  within  the  carding  policies  and  international
communication which I find positive or questionable. This section will discuss a
few points relating to my views on ethics and practicality of the EU’s carding
system.
As stated in a previous chapter, the cards may be interpreted as strong-arming a
nation  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe  in  an  ethically  questionable  manner.
Furthermore, Manners’ writings on the EU’s effort to abolish capital punishment
(2002) shows that this isn’t the first time the EU has made a conscious effort to
spread its norms outside its borders. I interpret this as the EU being well aware of
it’s  position of power and normative power,  and applying it  in ways that  will
prove beneficial to the EU’s wants and/or needs. However, this description may
make the EU appear more sinister than I personally think it should. Assuming that
the carding policy was born out of a will to preserve life in the oceans, protect
livelihoods and ensure that the supply of marine products will not run out due to
over-fishing,  the  ethics  behind  the  cards  become  muddled.  While  it  may  be
unethical to pressure an independent nation into adopting your norms, it may also
be argued that not using the powers available to you for “the greater good” would
also be unethical. It comes down to scales and how the policies affect the local,
national, international and global scene. 
I personally am not entirely sure how one may improve the carding system. It is
effective as it is now, albeit only when applied to actors over whom the EU holds
power. It is a given that one may bring up more open communication and equality
between actors in the discussions surrounding the cards, but as power dynamics
are heavily embedded in the subject that is easier said than done. Instead, one
point which was brought up by multiple informants, and with which I agree, is
leading by example.  While the EU does promote sustainability  in its fisheries,
there have been multiple controversies where the EU itself has committed IUU
fishery, within and outside of its borders. My informants brought up the case of
EU boats fishing off the coast of northern Africa. If the EU were to address these
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concerns, and make a big deal about it, I believe more nations may be inclined to
follow their example and/or make discussions easier on the international scene.
That is: leading by example by showing action against what their detractors point
to. I believe this could be a stepping stone towards a more open discussion and
promote an atmosphere of good will between nations.
To conclude  my thoughts:  the  EU’s  carding  system is  flawed and laden  with




This thesis set out to investigate the power dynamics between Vietnam and the
EU, their power relations and the use of normativity through the use of discourse
analysis. The results were achieved by interviewing representatives from a variety
of organizations and applying the theories of power relations, normative power
and cultural relativity. 
As stated in the introduction: fishery is not only a source of food, but much more.
Marine products are an important asset for many nations around the world. The
fight against IUU fishery is important for that reason. However, there are many
opinions  and  methods  surrounding  how IUU  fishery  should  be  combated.
Different  viewpoints  and values  have  become  apparent  throughout  this  thesis,
regarding  both  local  and  international  methods  for  regulations.  Based  on  the
interviews  it  may  be  surmised  that  the  EU,  holding  a  significant  amount  of
normative power through their  market,  is  able to  inject  their  normative  values
regarding what is sustainable fishery into another nation. 
The  issues  surrounding  IUU fishery  span  many  industries  and  interests.  This
makes it all the more important to look at all parts and interpretations of a story.
While  one  may object  to  the  EU’s  policies,  one must  admit  that  they  do get
results. Reality is relative and the definition of what is right and wrong, good or
bad, is based on the interpretation of reality of those who try to define it. It is
regrettable that the author was unable to discuss the issues of IUU fishery and the
carding policy with a representative from the EU. Because, at the end of the day,
the  viewpoints  of  the  EU  regarding  their  carding  policy  will  add  another
dimension to the findings of this thesis.
As, Manners (2002) argued that “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in
world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all.”, the author is inclined to
agree with his viewpoint based on the material found and presented in previous
chapters. The EU’s transferral and dissemination of norms, with the current use of
market pressure to transfer their norms and ideals to other nations, has proven
successful  in  both  the  past  and  present.  Furthermore,  their  position  as  a
supranational  union of high-income nations  requesting a  middle-income nation
reform  their  policies  to  what  the  EU  deems  acceptable  makes  the  power
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distribution between them apparent. We see two actors where the one holds the
power  to  critically  damage  the  other’s  economy  by  ceasing  trade  in  marine
products,  should  their  demands  not  be  met.  Such  an  imbalance  of  power
reinforces the norms of a status quo hierarchy of “developing” and “developed”
nations. These norms in turn are further enabled by how the “developing” nation
Vietnam has more to lose by not conforming to the established norms of power
distribution than the “developed” EU has by cutting trade relations.
To answer the original research question in short, I see how presents their inherent
values and norms throughout the discussion during IUU fishery dialogue. While
each interview provided one or multiple methods to combat IUU fishery, they all
were distinct from one another. The answers to the issue are coloured and adapted
by the culture, knowledge and experiences the interviewee holds, and it becomes
apparent through the subjects they bring up when discussing the issue. 
This  study  has  shown  how  power  dynamics  and  normative  power  are
interconnected in the global stage. That alone does not make this study unique.
This these shows that  by combining elements  of Foucauldian and Hirdmann’s
theories of power, and assuming the culturally relative view that actions are based
on the internalized norms of what is considered good and right, we gain a new
lens to interpret the interaction and application of power between two actors. The
interconnection between power dynamics and normativity becomes a motivation
for the powerful  to spread their  norms in the interest  of  promoting  what  they
believe is good. While the powerful themselves, in this case the EU, may not live
up to their own norms and ideals, they still appear as the example of the ideal to
themselves and their others, while the power is given to them by another actor
who may have more  to  lose  by withholding  the  power.  This  shows just  how
intricate and complex the situation is with Vietnam and the EU’s yellow card, and
presumably many other similar situations worldwide.
This thesis has provided insight in the present diversity of discourse, priorities and
opinions surrounding IUU fishery and Vietnam’s yellow card. These differences
show  that  there  are  still  many  hurdles  to  overcome  on  the  scene  of  global
cooperation and communication.  Supplementing the results of this study with a
follow-up study on how global issues are discussed and understood on a local
level in Vietnam would be very helpful. Furthermore, applying the theories and
method  of  this  thesis  to  studies  of  moral  and  ethical  discussions  regarding
sustainability  and  development  may  also  yield  interesting  results.  The
philosophical aspects of ethics and morality are affected by the values internalized
by  a  person,  and  cultural  relativity  means  that  it  will  differ  between  people.
Therefore the application of this combination of theories will allow us to see the
will of those with power to spread “good” methods by example, as motivated by
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the giving of power which enables the practice of power, which in turn enables
the spreading of one’s norms. 
In the globalized world of today it is more important than ever for us to go the
extra mile to understand each other. Further studies so that we may lead the way
to better understanding and cooperation between different parties in the future. 
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Appendix 1: Interviewees and dates.
1. FAO (March 04 2020)
2. FAO (March 12 2020)
3. FAO (March 24 2020)
4. FAO (March 12 2020)
5. Vietnamese NGO (March 25 2020)
6. Vietnamese GO (March 9 2020)
7. Swedish GO (March 26 2020)
8. Swedish NGO (February 04 2020)
9. Swedish NGO (March 12 2020)
10. UK NGO (May 12 2020)
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Appendix 2. 
Examples of interview questions.
The following questions were used to start conversations. The discussions they
brought forward continued through the use of follow-up questions made up using
the context of what was said. 
• Can you explain to me how (organization name) works with IUU fishery?
• Can you explain to me which part of the I, U and U you believe is the most
important?
• What is the best way to prevent IUU fishery?
• Apart from trade and sustainability, are there any other sectors IUU fishery
may affect?
• What are your thoughts about the carding policy of the EU?
• How would/does/may a red card affect a nation/Vietnam?
• What  is  the  role  of  locals/governments/NGOs  in  the  context  of  IUU
fishery?
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